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Abstract: The focus of the article is on global-local interrelation in a  globally integrated system of 
production, analysed through the Global Value Chain (GVC) framework. The unit of analysis is the 
small and medium enterprise (SME) as relevant unit when dealing with poverty reduction and 
distribution. The GVC allows to determine how the SMEs insert themselves in this system and what 
are the factors that cause a potential suboptimal insertion. The picture is further complicated by 
specific international agreements (for exemple, TRIPs and TRIMs) and market liberalization. The 
case of the automotive industry in Mexico exemplifies these risks and helps to better identify the 
potential role of governmental policies if a better insertion want to be guaranteed and a more 
equal development promoted. 
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Resumo: O foco do artigo é a inter-relação entre global e local em um sistema globalmente 
integrado de produção, analisado através do quadro da Cadeia de Valor Global (CVG). A unidade 
de análise é a pequena e média empresa (PME) como unidade relevante quando se trata de 
redução de pobreza e distribuição de renda. A Cadeia de Valor Global permite que se determine 
como as PMEs se inserem neste sistema e quais são os fatores que causam uma inserção abaixo do 
potencial ideal. O quadro se torna mais complicado por acordos internacionais específicos (por 
exemplo, os TRIPs e TRIMs) e liberalização do mercado. O caso da indústria automobilística no 
México exemplifica esses riscos e ajuda a identificar melhor o papel potencial das políticas 
governamentais para que se garanta uma melhor inserção e um desenvolvimento mais igualitário 
promovido. 
Palavras-chave: CVG, PMEs, inserção, desigualdades e políticas. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Rapid technological innovation, the telecommunication revolution, the 
widespread adoption of liberalization policies and the industrial reorganization are 
changing the environment in which firms operate. Particularly, "'a more advanced 
and complex form of internationalisation which implies a degree of functional 
integration between internationally dispersed economic activities" has 
characterized the new global order (DICKEN, 1992, p. 1). This has relevant 
implications for many developing countries and a combination ofthe literature on 
Global Value Chain (GVC) combined with an example case study of the Mexican 
automotive industry attempts to address this issue. 
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The GVC approach examines how global production and distribution are 
interlinked. Additionally, it includes if and how firms in developing countries can 
reinforce their position. The international integrated system of production (IISP) 
and the links between firms in the South and in the North of the world bring 
opportunities or challenges in developing countries (PIETROBELLI &SVERRISON, 
2004). Countries have the opportunity to sustain industrial growth and upgrading 
of economic activities by accessing new markets, technology and skills 
(KAPLINSKY &MORRIS, 2002). Firebaugh (1998) argues that countries with a 
higher rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) present a faster economic 
growth.Nevertheless, the central objective of development is not just to promote 
growth but also to advance social goals such as poverty reduction and human 
development. Indeed, “people are the real wealth of the nations, and the main 
goal of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, 
healthy, creative lives” (MALHOTRA, 2006).  
Many factors impede an equal distribution of the gains due to the 
participation in the global system of production. There is a tendency towards 
increasing inequality in developing countries and also developed countries thus 
those who have lost from this process of a globalized system of production are not 
just the non-participants but also who has actively participated. It is fundamental 
to understand the extent to which the ties that bind North and South leading to 
greater opportunities for development (PIETROBELLI &SVERRISSON 2004). 
Within this context, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) might represent the 
ideal unit of analysis for linking the functioning of the IISP and the promotion of 
development. SMEs and their relevance from an economic and social point of view 
allows a discussion of the implication of the IISP for industrialization and 
development, a case study of the Mexican automotive industry will illustrate this. 
 
1. THE TIES THAT BIND: A GVC PERSPECTIVE FOR SMEs ANDDEVELOPMENT 
 
1.1 New structural features: the International Integrated System of Production  
 
The IISP has become a central feature of a global system in which activities 
spread across national boundaries and are functionally integrated (GEREFFI, 1994). 
Transnationalization of production is increasing rapidly and Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs), particularly from the TRIAD (European Union, Japan and 
USA), play a key role (ALTENBURG, 2000). The IISP counts 82,053 TNCs with 
807,363 foreign affiliates and they contribute to 57.2% of the world gross 
domestic product (GDP) (UNCTAD, 2009). Out of the 100 largest economies 51 
are multinational companies and only 49 are countries (ANDERSON and 
CAVANAGH, 2000). 
A suitable measure for analysing the degree of international integration is 
FDI which is an “overseas investment by companies to set up a new overseas 
subsidiary or acquire a controlling interest in another company” (GRIMWADE, 
2000). FDI flow is increasing exponentiallyand since the early 1990s it has been 
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the major source of capital in developing countries (UNCTAD, 1999).The tendency 
is for TNCs to specialise in core competences and outsource the non-core activities 
in developing countries by fragmenting the production process (UNCTAD, 1999). 
In this way TNCs and domestic firms become interwoven “in intricate webs of 
contractual and non-contractual relations” (LALL, 2004, p.4).Although the 
increase in global trade, the premises of a spread development induced by 
globalization and liberalization have not taken place. The number of people living 
in absolute poverty remains stable whilst the distribution of income intra-country 
and inter-country has increasingly become more unequal. Economic growth and 
international trade are necessary but not sufficient conditions for development 
since many aspects still impede the spread of gains. 
 
1.2 Global Value Chain and the understanding of inequality   
 
GVC represents an appropriate analytical framework forunderstanding how 
the economic integration and the international fragmentation of production affects 
countries and firms including SMEs. “The value chaindescribes the full range of 
activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception, 
through the different phases of production (involving a combination of physical 
transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery to final 
consumers, and final disposal after use” (KAPLINSKY &MORRIS, 2002, p.4). The 
value chain analysis permits the identification ofkey determinants and the nature 
of enterprise competitivenessthrough an evaluation of the core functions of firms 
and the process of outsourcing (OECD, 2007). Furthermore, the extension of the 
analysis at global level through the GVC framework can offer a deep 
understanding of modality of connection and participation of the producers from 
different countries in the global market (KAPLINSKY &MORRIS, 2002).  
The GVC framework allows us to map the earnings and rewards along each 
link of the chain andthe rents determined by the relationships and coordination of 
the activities along the chain (KAPLINSKY, 2004). Particularly, a firm’s 
development and the distribution of returns are affected by rent opportunities and 
governance structure. “The concept of rent is used to describe a world where the 
parties who control a particular set of resources are able to insulate themselves 
from competition by taking advantage of, or by creating barriers to the entry of 
competitors” (Ibid., p.5). Intangible assets, supportive policies and anticompetitive 
practices are major source of rent opportunities (UNCTAD, 1997). 
The value of the GVC lies, not only in the idea of an input-output structure 
(a production process made of a sequence of value adding activities), but also in 
the original concept of governance within this structure (SVERRISSON, 2004). 
Governance means coordinating the activities between different parties and 
managing relations between them (GEREFFI, 1999). Particularly, some actors 
influence the division of labour and the upgrade opportunities for other parties 
creating power asymmetries among participants (HUMPHREY, 2003).  
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GVC governance structure can be producer-driven or buyer-driven 
(GEREFFI, 1999). The former represents a chain in which large manufacturers 
coordinate the activities along the chain and organise the assembly whilst different 
tiers of subcontractors provide components (UNIDO, 2004). A buyer-driven chain 
refers instead to industries in which big retailers and marketers play the central role 
in deciding what has to be produced and the locations but are not involved in the 
production (SVERRISSON, 2004). Both chains are similar in the fact that “power 
resides squarely at the top and towards the end” and the governance of the chain 
is geared by profit maximization of the lead firms (SVERRISSON, 2004, p.19).  
Governance can have different patterns depending on the coordination of 
the linkages among firms (GEREFFI et al., 2005). These patterns depend upon 
three variables: complexity of information exchanged between firms, the 
possibility to quite easily codify information and the capabilities of the suppliers to 
meet the requirements (GEREFFI et al., 2005). The interaction between these 
variables defines relationships with different degrees of coordination and power 
asymmetry between actors.  
The understanding of thedynamic functioning of the chain helps to define 
who gains and who looses and it becomes a tool for uncovering the 
interconnections between firms and countries and for defining wheatear there is a 
direct causality between the IISP and the exacerbating of inequalities between and 
within countries.The identification of these dynamics highlights the room for 
producer’s initiatives and policy interventions if a better mode of insertion in the 
chain wants to be pursued and a more equal distribution promoted (KAPLINSKY, 
2004). 
 
1.3 SMEs and the insertion into the GVC 
 
SMEs are a relevant unit of analysis for understanding the inequality caused 
by globalization because of their social and economic characteristics, but they also 
are the most vulnerable actors in the global market (CEGLI &DINI, 1999). For that 
reason, to what extent domestic firms benefit from an insertion into the IISP 
becomes a central issue. 
The integration of SMEs into the GVC represent an opportunity to reap the 
benefits of globalization throughlinkages with lead firms and access to critical 
resources like finance, technology, skills and access to markets. “The challenge for 
developing countries is to ensure that such linkages occur” but also that “they 
contribute to the growth and competitiveness of SMEs and the development of 
the economy as a whole” (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 26).There might be different types 
of linkages between domestic firms and TNCs: backward with suppliers, forward 
with costumers, with competitors and with technology partners (ALTENBURG, 
2000). However, UNCTAD in the World Investment Report 2001 highlights the 
formation of backward linkages as main vehicle to transfer skills, technology and 
know-how from foreign enterprises to domestic firms. These linkages are also the 
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most common in developing countries and the analysis will concentrate on this 
category. 
Intangible and tangible assets can be transferred to domestic SMEs through 
linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers (UNCTAD, 2001). The 
benefits of these linkages might be 10 to 20 times larger than those depending on 
trade liberalization alone (MORAN, 2002).The GVC approach assumes that 
international linkages necessarily and automatically contribute to technological 
transfer and innovation. Particularly important is the concept of upgrading which 
means theability to change the nature of the activities in each link of the chain and 
the relationships among firms (UNCTAD, 2010). Upgrading involves, for example, 
an increase in efficiency of internal process, new products, move to another link of 
the chain and increase in value-added.  
The main assumption in the GVCmodel is that “development requires 
linking up with the most significant “lead firms” in an industry” (GEREFFI, 1999, 
p.3). The local dimension is completely unconsidered and local upgrading 
initiatives are not contemplated because thisdepends solely upon the power 
structure in the chain (SVERRISSON, 2004). The lack of a local perspective 
represents a major shortcoming in the framework because host countries need a 
certain level of absorptive capacity to absorb and benefit from FDI. It is a 
fundamental condition to convert FDI into positive spillovers and to reduce the risk 
of SMEs being stuck in low value added activities (NGUYEN et al., 2009). 
Blomström, Lipsey, and Zejan (1996) in a study on developing countries illustrate 
that the more income per capita of a country the more the positive impact of FDI 
in the domestic economy.Particularly, FDI inflow increases when local capabilities 
are strengthened and at the same time, the stronger the local capabilities, the 
more the benefits created in the domestic economy (LALL &NARULA, 2006). It 
means that less industrialized countries are more likely to be stuck in low-value 
added activities of the value chain, including assembly and packaging, and 
spillovers might not spread in the local economy (UNCTAD, 2001). TNCs largely 
act as developmental enterprises but this is more common in industrialized 
countries (ALTENBURG, 2000) resulting in serious challenges for domestic SMEs in 
developing countries. 
 
1.3.1 Risks of a suboptimal  insertion 
 
The insertion in the GVC can deliver higher returns and employment but 
the achievement of these gains depend on where the firm lies in the value chain 
(Nadvi, 2004). In some cases, GVC “never acquire roots in the periphery [and]… 
many local chains never reach the core” (SVERRISSON, 2004, p.25).   
 Generally, “less industrialized locations are assigned simpler tasks like 
assembly and packaging, while more skill- and technology- intensive functions are 
allocated to industrially more advanced locations” (UNCTAD, 2001, P.9). This 
matches the self-interest of many TNCs for including backward economies as 
cheap providers of basic inputs and it excludes most domestic SMEs from relevant 
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spillovers and upgrading opportunities (SVERRISSON, 2004). In some 
manufacturing industries firms spend more than half of the profit on inputs 
offering a strategic reason for outsourcing the manufacturing process in cheaper 
locations (UNCTAD, 2001). Domestic SMEs usually do not have any bargaining 
power and heavily depend on large firms. The relationship is far less beneficial for 
the supplier which might be forced to carry on a competition based on reduction 
of costs with serious risks for labour standards, wages and profits (ALTENBURG, 
2000). The risk for SMEs is to get trapped in what is called ‘immiserising growth’ 
with increased economic activity but reduced returns (Ibid.). 
The ability to build beneficial (for small local firms) SME-TNC linkages 
depends on the competitiveness of the SME,the strategy of the TNC and the 
existence of supportive public policies (UNCTAD, 2005). Regarding the 
requirement of competitiveness, many domestic suppliers offer costs advantages 
for TNCs because are unable to meet high quality and efficiency requirements. 
Forhat reason “foreign investment in high value-added activities […] tends to be 
‘location-sticky’” (LALL &NARULA, 2006). Thestrategy pursued by TNCs is 
associated with the economic rationale for investing in the host country such as 
the search for markets, resources, efficiency and strategic assets (NARULA 
&DUNNING, 2000). The first three motives are the most common in developing 
countries as assets-exploiting strategies to increase rent opportunities (LALL 
&NARULA, 2006). The other important factor is the existence of supportive 
policies. UNCTAD (2005, p.31) highlights that “it is obvious that merely opening 
the door to FDI will not result in the country’s economic development”. Host 
countries should therefore promote policies for development with an explicit focus 
on SMEs and interventions should focus on the determinants mentioned above in 
order to optimize the SME insertion in the GVC. However, the room for policy 
intervention has been seriously compromised by the supranational political and 
economic context.  
 
1.4 Supranational policy framework: new challenges 
 
Government should drive a process of industrialization by promoting 
selective policies. It means targeting a sector and specific firms when dealing with 
GVC and the development opportunities of suppliers (LALL & NARULA, 2006). 
However, there are currently more restrictions due to international agreements 
and market liberalization (UNCTAD, 2006).Particularly, some effective industrial 
policies are not applicable anymore under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules or are considered less relevant under the neo-liberal ideology. WTO rules 
include key multilateral trading agreementsincluding the agreement on subsidies 
and countervailing measures (SCM), the agreement on Trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and the Trade-related investments measures 
(TRIMs). 
SCM regulates the provision of subsidies and the countervailing of damages 
caused by imports that are subsidized in the country of origin (UNCTAD, 2006). 
The most serious consequence for developing countries is the inability to use 
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subsidies conditional on export performance.The TRIPs agreement establishes a 
system of protection of intellectual property rights including the extension of 
patent protection to 20 years and the restriction of the government’s ability to 
regulate innovators (SHADLEN, 2005). This regulation implies benefits for the 
leading innovators but negative consequences for developing countries (LALL, 
2003). Indeed, it “can raise the cost of formal technology transfer by allowing 
technology sellers to impose stricter restrictions and by preventing copying and 
“reverse engineering”” (LALL, 2004, p.5). Contrarily, aspects like technological 
transfer and technical cooperation which are of central interest for developing 
countries are vaguely mentioned in the agreement. It creates an asymmetric 
system of protection which is even more alarming considering that in 2001 five 
developed countries accounted for 83.6 per cent of the patents (UNCTAD, 2006). 
The TRIMs limit the use of adoption of performance requirements, including the 
local content requirement and the export performance, that aim at creating 
effective linkages between foreign investors and local producers (UNCTAD, 2006).  
The challenge for policy makers in developing countries is complex since 
“the rules and commitments of the international trading regime restrict the de jure 
ability of developing nations to adopt national development policy” (UNCTAD, 
2006, p.167). This “may force poor countries with weak industrial bases to 
become over-dependent on FDI to drive industrial development. This cannot meet 
a major part of industrialization needs….[it] threaten to freeze comparative 
advantages in areas where capabilities exist at the time of liberalization” (LALL 
&NARULA, 2006, pp. 14-15). This scenario is further complicated by the existence 
ofless formal rules which affect developing countries autonomy like structural 
adjustment programmes, corporation’s power to lobby governments and bilateral 
agreements (STIGLITZ, 2006). Even anticompetitive practices that create non-
traditional barriers to entry are common (UNCTAD, 1997). The problem is when 
restrictive business practices are not illegal in the host country and government 
agrees to admit anticompetitive practices in order to attract FDI (Ibid.).  
It is evident how the promise of development in developing countries is 
seriously compromised by a potential predatory behaviour of TNCs and a less 
favourable supranational policy framework. The new policy challenges and the 
risks of a suboptimal insertion for domestic SMEs are explored in the case of the 
automotive industry in Mexico.   
 
2. SMEs – TNCs LINKAGES IN THE MEXICAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 New Structural features: integration of Mexico in the global system of 
production 
 
During the presidency of De la Madrid (1982-1988) Mexico began a 
process of structural adjustment shifting from a developmental state model to a 
strategy of liberalization, deregulation and privatization (MORENO-BRID et al, 
2005). In 1986 Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
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The industrial strategy aimed at promoting exports and investments mainly 
through tax and credit incentives. In line with the process of structural 
transformation, during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), a 
new Law of Foreign Investment was enacted which approved the liberalization of 
FDI, removal of performance requirements and tax incentive for imports for re-
exportation (UNCTAD, 2006). In 1994, the NAFTA further reinforced the opening 
up of the Mexican economyand the article 102 states the purpose of the 
agreement which is to “eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-
border movement of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties; 
[…] increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of  the Parties” 
(NAFTA, 1994). 
As a consequence of integration in the IISP, Mexico became an important 
recipient of FDI (table I). In 2009 almost 50 percent of inflow FDI came from the 
US followed by Canada, Spain, United Kingdom and Netherlands (INEGI, 2009a). 
Exports (fig. I) have been the sign of the Mexican economic success in 
manufacturing with a rate of growth of 20 per cent per year since 1985 
(ALTENBURG et al, 1998). The country was classified as one of the ten winners in 
the global production system with an increase of 1.57 percent in the participation 
of manufactures exports between 1994 and 2001 (ECLAC, 2003). Despite the 
explosion in exports the expectation of growth were not completely fulfilled 
(MORENO-BRID et al, 2005). Mexico managed to maintain a small deficit and a 
low level of inflation, and succeeded in attracting FDI but less encouraging are the 
performance in terms of industrial development. The GDP has been stagnant, the 
balance of payment negative and the technological gap has not been reduced 
(ZEPEDA et al., 2009). 
 
 
Table I. FDI overview (millions of dollars and percentage) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2010 
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Fig.I. Mexico: Imports and Exports, 1975-2000. 
Source:INEGI, 2009a 
 
The poor industrial performance is a consequence of the industrial policy 
adopted. From late 1980s the industrial strategy has beenpassive with a lack of 
intervention in relation to economic activities and horizontal with no sectoral 
orientation (MORTIMORE &VERGARA, 2006). Particularly, no effective measures 
for supporting SMEs insertion into the world market were included with serious 
economic and social consequences (ALTENBURG et al, 1998). Following the 
classification of the Mexican Economic Census 2004 (table II), SMEs constitute the 
backbone of the Mexican economy with 99.8 per cent of the total firms, and they 
provide the bulk of employment, 71.9 per cent of the population (table III) (INEGI, 
2009).  
 
Table II. Classification of firms by sector and size (number of employees) 
 
Source: INEGI, 2004 
 
 
Table III.Economic Units and Employment by firms size 
 
Source: INEGI, 2009 
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In Mexico SMEs face many competitive problems and in the last 20 years 
151SME support programs have been designed and implemented in order to 
increase productivity, technology progress and human capital (LOPEZ-ACEVEDO 
&TINAJERO, 2010). In 1996, the Program of Industrial Policy and International 
Trade marked a shift in the manufacturing national strategy and the government 
took a proactive role in targeting production chains and the promotion of export-
oriented SMEs (ALTENBURG et al, 1998). From 2001 there was an increase in 
programs for SMEs and programs like PAC-CIMO, CRECE, COMPITE and 
FIDECAP were implemented for training, business development services and 
supplier development (LOPEZ-ACEVEDO &TINAJERO, 2010). However, in many 
cases these programmes have not been funded, managed and evaluated properly 
(Ibid.).  
Considering the inefficiency of these programmes and inadequacy of 
market-based mechanisms for supporting SMEs development and upgrading, the 
passive industrial strategy in Mexico increased the gap between large (mainly 
foreign) and small firms (RUIZ-DURÁN &CARRILLO, 2007). A passive industrial 
strategy caused a lack of spill over in the domestic economy and as a result, 
despite the export level and FDI inflow, the economic growth has been moderate 
ifcompared for example, to China (figure II).  Difference in paths depends on how 
countries manage the interaction with FDI as illustrated by the case of the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
 
 
Fig. II.FDI vs Rate of Growth (average), 1990-2007 
Source: WORLD BANK, 2010 
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2.2 Manufacturing industry 
 
The aim of the structural transformation was mainly to create a competitive 
manufacturing industry through the promotion of exports (figure III)(RUIZ-
DURÁN &CARRILLO, 2007). Mexico became the third exporter of manufactured 
goods to the US and, in 2009, the Mexican manufacturing sector accounted 
435436 units and employed 4522799 (table VIII) (LALL, 2000). 
 
Fig. III.Composition of Exports, Mexico 1980 – 2004 
 
 
 
Source: MORENO-BRID et al., 2005. 
 
 
Table IV – Economic Units and Employment contribution by sector 
 
Source: INEGI, 2009. 
 
Despite the success in exports Mexico did not perform well in terms of 
Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) (UNCTAD, 2003). This demonstrates that 
exports are not a sufficient condition for growth and that “part of this failure owes 
to the fact that Mexico manufactured exports have become increasingly 
dependent on imports, and hence are characterized by reduced local content and 
weak linkages with domestic suppliers” (MORENO-BRID et al, 2005, p. 22). 
Indeed, 70% of the exports involve the assembly of imported inputs that enter 
Mexico due to preferential tax schemes such as PITEX and ALTEX which reduce 
the cost of inputs by 30% (DUSSEL, 2003).Moreover, the lack of linkages with 
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domestic SMEs increases the amount of value added that goes to TNCs 
(MALHOTRA, 2006). As a result, Mexico’s share in world exports increased about 
fivefold in the 1990s whilst its MVA share did not even doubled (figure IV). The 
link between exports and MVA is not as strong as, for example, in China where 
industrial policies have been implemented to increase the local content of exports 
(figure V) (LALL, 2004). 
 
 
 
Fig. IV.China: share in world export of manufactures and MVA, 1980-2003  
(percentage)   
Source: UNIDO 1996, 2006; LALL, 2004. 
 
 
 
Fig. V - Mexico: share in world export of manufactures and MVA, 1980-2003 
(percentage)    
Source: UNIDO 1996, 2006; LALL, 2004. 
 
 
TNCs account, not only for most of the MVA but also for most of the 
exports. As a result, export competitiveness has not benefited the whole economy 
because the export sector is not integrated in the economy (DUSSEL, 1999). 
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that exports grew at 18 per cent a year 
between 1994 and 2002, whilst the GDP at only 3 per cent (MATTAR, MORENO-
BRID and PERES, 2003). The growth divergence between trade and income per 
capita is also impressive (figure VI). 
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Fig. VI. Trade and income divergence (percentage), 1970 – 2007 
Source: WORLD BANK, 2010. 
 
 
2.2.1 The driver of the Mexican success: the automotive industry 
 
Mexico’sexport-drive was concentrated in just a few sectors with auto parts 
and electronicsaccounting for 58% of the total exports in the period 1994-2003 
(MORENO-BRID et al, 2005). Of the total inflow of FDI from 1994 to 2004, 9% 
went to the automobile industry.  Mexico is the 10th automobile producer in the 
world (in terms of units produced); this sector accounts for 17.6 % of the 
manufacturing exports and 3% of the GDP. In 2007 and 2008 the production 
reached 2 million units of which 21% is devoted to the internal market and 79% 
to exports, mainly to the US (about 70 per cent). The industry accounts for 11% 
of employment in manufacturing (OICA, 2007). 
 
 
Fig. VII. Value of Automobile Exports (billion $), 1994-2007. 
Source:  AMIA, 2007. 
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Fig. VIII. Exports in the automotive industry (thousand of units), 1980-2007. 
Source: AMIA, 2007. 
 
The NAFTA agreement certainly played a central role in promoting exports 
and to “consolidate the integration of the Mexican automobile industry […] to the 
benefit of the United States auto TNCs” (MORTIMORE, 1998a, p. 110). Barriers 
to trade were eliminated. During the period 1993-1996 US tariffs on vehiclesfell 
from 2.7 to 0.6 facilitating export to the US and giving a boost to the automotive 
export platform(USITC, 1997).As a result, “thanks to NAFTA, Mexico’s car 
industry is now an integral part of that in the United States” (ECONOMIST, 1997, 
p.18). The boom of the automotive industry is quite impressive in terms of value 
(fig. VIII) and units (fig. VIII). 
The limits on imports to Mexico were eliminated thus facilitating imports by 
TNCs. The NAFTA agreement established that “intraregional tariffs increase with 
the degree of value added from outside the NAFTA region” (ALTENBURG, 2000, 
p.33). However, although the local content rules did not recognize country of 
ownership (BARRAGÁN &USHER, 2009). Unfortunately for domestic firms, a 
foreign owned firm (also 100% foreign owned like maquiladoras) but established 
in Mexico is considered local (CHAMBERS &SMITH, 2002). Therefore, 
international car producers move to Mexico and bring their global supplier in order 
to increase the local content (ALTENBURG et al., 1998). 
 
2.3 A GVC perspective 
 
The automotive industry is producer-driven with TNCs organized mainly in 
clusters (UNCTAD, 2002). The geographical spread of the production has been 
accompanied by excessive investments in the automotive sector which led to an 
excessive capacity and a stagnant market (HUMPHREY &MEMEDOVIC, 2003). 
These characteristics of the sector and the process of liberalizationcaused the crisis 
of inward-oriented firms whilst benefited export-oriented ones. The former were 
mainly local SMEs and the latter large TNCs (ALTENBURG et al, 1998). As relevant 
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determinants of the insertion in the GVC three factors need to be explored: TNCs 
strategy, linkages between large and small firms and requirements of 
competitiveness. 
The automotive industry is still concentrated in the hands of few 
multinationals accounting for three quarters of the market (MORTIMORE, 1998). 
The overinvestment and the competition between the TRIAD producers led to 
further concentration (HUMPHREY &MEMEDOVIC, 2003). In 2001 13 firms 
accounted for 87% of the vehicle production. As a result of competition, 
assembler or original equipment manufacturers (OEM) are involved in a 
“prevailing cutthroat competition for market share” and costs reduction (OECD, 
2007, p. 25). In Mexico the main motive for investing is efficiency-seeking 
because it represents “an important site for low-skilled, [and] labour-intensive 
production” with local wages that are the equivalent of 11.8% of US monthly 
wage (LYNCH, 1998, p. 21). The principle strategy is the creation of export 
platform through greenfield investments and following a maquiladora scheme with 
assembly plants for manufacturing exports (MORTIMORE, 2003b).  
Due to an acute competition the search for economies of scale becomes 
fundamental and the sophistication of vehicles as well (HUMPHREY 
&MEMEDOVIC, 2003). Producers let their international suppliers (first-tier) to 
follow them to Mexico creating clusters of TNCs. Lack of competent suppliers 
forces first-tier global supplier to import most of the inputs to the extend that only 
23% of auto parts is sourced by local firms (ibid). Strong relations are thus created 
between exporting firms and foreign suppliers with the consequence that even the 
production of components becomes concentrated.  
Not only do TNCs have advantages in terms of access to finance, 
economies of scale, scope, marketing, brand management and market share but 
they also put in place anticompetitive strategies. For example, many American 
automakers tend to switch suppliers to engage in predatory purchasing practices 
(STURGEON et al., 2008). Additionally, the figure on the market shares (with the 
exclusion of joint ventures) underestimates the real concentration because many 
TNCs have shareholdings in smaller firms and for example, Renault owns half of 
Nissan. In Mexico global and first-tier suppliers also sell to new customers “at a 
price that was significantly less than the pre-Mexico price […]. the end result was 
that many Mexican operations began to accrue profits above what their 
manufacturing activities actually deserved” (PWC, 2006, p. 4). As a result, TNCs 
manage to build high barriers to entryand gain a higher return. 
 
2.3.1 TNCs and SMEs: lack of backward linkages  
 
UNCTAD (1995) argues that efficiency-seeking strategy is the one with 
more positive impact on host countries industrial development. However, in 
Mexico 70% of the autoparts industry is controlled by foreign-owned firms and 
the creation of export platform excludesdomestic SMEs from the production 
system and from consistent spill over (ECLAC, 2001).  
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Since firms in the automotive industry spend more than half of revenues on 
inputs, the tendency is to outsource more processes and the first tier supplier 
subcontract to other firms (UNCTAD, 2001). This process might lead to the 
creation of a pyramid of five tiers: Assemblers, global and first-tier suppliers, 
second-tier suppliers, third-tier suppliers and aftermarket suppliers (ALTENBURG, 
2000). In 2006 the nine assemblers were: Ford, GM, Nissan, Toyota, Honda, 
Volkswagen, Renault, Chrysler and BMW (AMIA, 2007). The pyramid assumes a 
peculiar shape since strong ties are created betweenassembler and global suppliers 
(ALTENBURG, 2000). The latter are the international suppliers that provide the 
most sophisticated components and become specialized and dependent on TNCs 
purchases (UNCTAD, 2010). These ties are so strong that even “when the globally 
preferred supplier is unable or unwilling to establish a local production facility, the 
assembler’s second preference is to use another of its global suppliers” (UNIDO, 
2003). In 2003 there were already 1350 registered auto suppliers and 281 
constituted first tier ones (BANCOMEXT, 2004). Among the first tier suppliers only 
nine are domestic: VITRO, Grupo Industrial Saltillo, san luis RASSINI, 
IndustriasdeHuleGalgo, GrupoCarso, GrupoProeza, Grupo DESC, Grupo Alfa and 
Grupo QUIMMCO (BARRAGÁN &USHER, 2009).In the 1997, for example, 
Volkswagen started the production of the New Beattle model mainly for export to 
OECD countries (PRIES, 1999).  The pyramid of suppliers was mainly composed of 
European firms and just for the New Beetle “144 suppliers […] are based in 
Europe, while only 26 are 100% Mexican, most of the latter providing only simple 
items” (ALTENBURG, 2000, p.21). 
 The organization of the design function in the automotive industry is 
another relevant issue since the tendency is the creation of international and 
centralized design centres (HUMPHREY &MEMEDOVIC, 2003). Currently the 
main design centres are in Detroit (Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Toyota and 
Nissan), USA; Cologne (Ford), Rüsselsheim (Opel, General Motors), Wolfsburg 
(Volkswagen) and Stuttgart (Daimler-Benz), Germany; Paris (Renault), France; 
Tokyo (Nissan and Honda), Japan (STURGEON et al., 2008). The creation of such 
common platforms and the strong ties between assembler and global supplier 
creates a block from which spillovers and linkages cannot easily be created. Even 
technological partnering does not take place (ALTENBURG, 2000). Indeed, “the 
entire production system has not been oriented towards innovation, thus there is 
no need for inter-firm alliances” (Ibid. p.27). Moreover, all Mexican firms rely on 
foreign Research &Development (R&D)since there are no R&D departments inside 
the country (OECD, 2007). 
UNCTAD (2010) states thatin second and third tiers “no local SME [….] has 
been able to leverage its link to GVCs as a springboard for its own 
internationalization” (ibid, p. 11). For example, it is indicated as the TNC with the 
higher degree of local purchases and the higher probability of spillovers 
(BARRAGÁN &USHER, 2009). In 2000 Volkswagen purchased 60% of its inputs 
from 258 local suppliers and helped 200 of them to acquire certifications like ISO 
9000 and VDA 6.1. However, most of the first tier suppliers have German origins 
even if considered local because of the NAFTA local content definition. Moreover, 
the firms that got a quality certification are other TNCs or joint venture with 
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Mexican firms, not independent local firms. Therefore, even Volkswagen works in 
collaboration only with global or 1 tier suppliers and it has not developed linkages 
with domestic SMEs. 
 
2.3.2 SMEs:systematic uncompetitiveness 
 
In the automotive industry the system of standards and the codification 
possibilities do not facilitate the creation of modular linkages. There are two main 
reasons. Firstly, from a technical point of view the “rising vehicle complexity has 
continued to overwhelm efforts to fully codify vehicle designs or the design 
process” (STURGEON et al., 2008, p. 15). Secondly, the concentration of the 
market gives TNCs an immense power. Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck and Gereffi 
(2008, p.308) state that “as the competence to design complex parts and sub-
systems has shifted from automakers to suppliers, the need for co-design has 
meant that captive and pure market GVC linkages have become harder to 
maintain”. This is partly the truth since tightlinkages between assembler, global 
and first tier supplier are constituted due to the complexity of information, the 
tacit component of information (design and testing process) and the need for 
capable suppliers. This dynamic qualifies relational linkages. However, captive 
linkages cannot be excluded in relation to lower tiers that are stuck in low-value 
added activities and are kept far from any upgrade opportunities.  
TNCs strategy and the characteristics of the sector, not only create few 
linkages, but they don’t even contribute to SMEs competitiveness. SMEs are 
dominant in second or lower tiers which are, not only far from any linkages, but 
also inserted in the GVC in a way that did not create desirable impact since it has 
fuelled what is called the “low road to competitiveness” (SENGENBERGER &PYKE, 
1992). TNCs, like Toyota and Nissan, are driven solely by the possibility to reduce 
costs and “the benefits generated from these kinds of TNC activities based on 
efficiency-seeking strategies accrue primarily to the TNCs themselves and not the 
host countries” (MORTIMORE &VERGARA, 2006). Design and management 
functions are concentrated in the hands of assembler and global buyers and low 
tier suppliers are involved in vehicle assembly and production of low-tech 
components. Cooperation between the 1-tier suppliers and lower tiers is focused 
on production with no involvement of process and product development (OECD, 
2007). SMEs do not play a role as suppliers since “much of Mexico's exports are in 
fact intrafirm trade by corporations that operate NAFTA wide, relocating certain 
labor-intensive parts of the production chain to Mexico” (ALTENBURG et al, 1998, 
p. 16). Therefore, the links with the local economy are then reduced, if not 
eliminated (RUIZ-DURÁN &CARRILLO, 2007). 
The process of liberalization seriously impacted the domestic firms 
(MORTIMORE, 2004). Subsidies, taxes, protectionist measures and performance 
requirements have been phased out and the Mexican export platform did not go 
“beyond its role in assembly activities” (MORENO-BRID et al, 2005, p. 13). An 
intense competition and overinvestment push price down and require higher 
capabilities which many SMEs do not posses (UNIDO, 2004). SMEs do not possess 
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any absorptive capacity (initial level of technology, human capital, institutions and 
financial) essential for knowledge and technological spillovers (UNCTAD, 2007). 
Local SMEs become thus more vulnerable and dependent from TNCs that are free 
to move to cheaper locations (UNCTAD, 2010). In 2000, for example, the 23 % of 
the maquiladoras plants closed and half of them moved to other countries, mainly 
to China (RUIZ-DURÁN &CARRILLO, 2007). The economic dependence of SMEs 
from large producers manifested itself during the economic crisis in 2008 
(UNCTAD, 2010). FDI to Mexico dropped by 40 per cent from 2007 to 2008  
(ECLAC, 2008). The production collapsed by 43,2 % in the first trimester in 2009 
mainlybecause 70% of theproductionwasexported to the US (AMIA, 2007).  
There is increasing international recognition that free market policies have 
been disappointing in Mexico since exports and FDI have not promoted 
development (POLASKI, 2004). Mexico missed the opportunity to create spill over 
and technological transfer with negative consequences on labour productivity, 
wages and creation of jobs (HUMPHREY &MEMEDOVIC, 2003). This is reflected 
in the persistent and disappointing social inequalities in the Mexican society where, 
for example, the divergence between exports and employment growth and 
between wages and manufacturing productivity increased in the last decade. The 
identification of losers and winner in the automotive industry helps to understand 
how the main causes of failure have been the limited backward linkages between 
TNCs and domestic SMEs, and the limited growth of value added in the 
manufacturing sector. The evidence suggests the need for a review of national 
development strategies in order to avoid some of Mexico’s mistakes. Many 
restrictions on trade imposed by a process of liberalization and the NAFTA should 
be avoided and instead selective policies promoted. National policies should be 
adopted to effectively use FDI from a development perspective and to avoid the 
risk of “latecomers being mired in low growth traps from which market forces 
cannot extract them” (LALL, 2004, p.25). 
 
3. POLICY CONCLUSIONS      
 
In order to target SMEs and strategies for increasing the local value-added and 
for improving trade balance interventions should be implemented at the level of 
SMEs competitiveness, TNC strategy and explicit supportive policies for linkages 
formation. 
 
3.1 Promotion of SMEs competitiveness 
 
“The Washington Consensus failed to include policies for [..] 
microeconomic improvements in the areas of competition, technology and 
enterprise” (Ibid., p. 14) which are fundamental policies for avoiding the low road 
of competitiveness.In this regard, one key factor is the availability and competence 
of suppliers and the development of absorptive capacities (UNCTAD, 2001). A 
major intervention should be on human capital including better quality and higher 
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enrolment rates at schools. However, there is a difference between capacity and 
capability and a local effort is needed to master the tacit component and adapt it 
to the local production through, for example, R&D expenditure and investment in 
public research laboratories (LALL, 2000). The article 8 of the SCM accepts these 
interventions opening room for a subsidies system without breaking WTO rules 
even if with more financial constraints on developing countries (UNCTAD, 2006).  
Another fundamental issue is the promotion of general programmes for 
overcoming SMEs constraints due to their small size, like lowering transaction costs, 
addressing market failures and promoting cluster formation (LALL, 2000). With 
regards to transaction costs regulations, like the cost of quality certification, that 
discriminate small firms should be addressed by designing differentiated 
regulations. Market failures can be addressed through institutional interventions 
that aim at providing training, access to finance, market information and links with 
relevant institutions (CEGLIE &DINI, 1999). Another important factor is the link 
between industrial sector and public institutions, like universities and research 
institutions, to favour access to information, skilled labours and innovation. The 
direct promotion of cluster of firms might help both in the lowering of transaction 
costs and market failures. Indeed, agglomerations breed externalities, like 
economies of scale, and joint action between firms and institutions (SCHMITZ, 
1999).SMEs face multiple problems that can be addressed only through an 
integrated approach. Therefore, the interventions mentioned above should be part 
of a unique and coordinated package instead of isolated programmes.  
 
3.2 Regulation of TNCs strategies 
 
Selectivity in policies should be guaranteed even when considering 
strategies for attracting FDI. FDI liberalization has to be accompanied with 
“measures aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of markets, including, in 
particular, measures to regulate and control anticompetitive practices by firms” 
(UNCTAD, 1997, p.210). Competition policyis one of those.However, domestic 
competition laws that limit the monopoly power of TNCs, like limitation of merger 
opportunities, are restricted by WTO rules (MALHOTRA, 2006). This requires 
international cooperation between countries (especially developing countries) in 
order to overcome differences in competition-law regime and the protection that 
countries guarantee to their national companies. Bilateral competition agreements 
with the major trading partners might be a solution. One potential way forward 
would be the establishment ofan International Competition Authority “to control 
the anti-competitive conduct of the world’s large multinational corporations […] 
as well as to control their propensity to grow by takeovers and mergers” (SINGH, 
2002, p.22). Another important issue is the possibility to regulate measures that 
impose costs on local firms but benefit TNCs by aligning private incentives and 
social benefits (STIGLITZ, 2006). Therefore, government in developed countries 
should embrace and regulatedCorporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
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3.3 Industrial policies 
 
Whilst the measures included in the previous sections enable the framework 
for linkages formation, also explicit policies for linkages promotion can be explored. 
Policies might be designed to selectively attract TNCs that would promote 
technology spill over and transfer technology to local suppliers(ALTENBURG, 
2000). After the identification of the potential insertion of domestic firms and the 
kind of support firms need to upgrade, it is possible to evaluate the feasibility of 
investments in endogenous capabilities. Consequently, only firms with a real 
potential should be targeted and supported to build a relation with TNCs. It 
implies for governments to target the right groups and define policy responses 
making “sure from the beginning that large corporations are involved in and 
committed to supplier development programs” (Ibid. p.40). This strategy should 
include the development of strategic private-public cooperation “with the aim of 
uncovering where the most significant obstacles to restructuring lie and what type 
of interventions are most likely to remove them” (RODRIK, 2004, p.3).A joint 
promotion strategy includes the participation of the relevant institutions and firms 
including banks, trade unions, civil society organizations and government agencies 
(UNCTAD, 2001). 
Regarding specific measure for linkages promotion, prior to the era of 
liberalization they were promoted through local content requirements. “There is, 
however, flexibility within the existing international policy framework” and policy 
makers should take advantages of it (UNCTAD, 2001, p. 17). Only few measures 
are permitted like “skill formation, technology support, innovation financing, FDI 
promotion and targeting…and all general subsidies that do not affect trade 
performance” (LALL, 2004, p. 27). In general, the main resistance are towards 
policies to promote specific industry and there is a better tolerance for policies that 
aim at creating the right conditions for industrialization (HAQUE, 2007).Local 
content requirements measures can be replaced with policy measures such as rules 
of origins, screw-driver regulations and anti-dumping which were broadly adopted 
by developed countries. Even economic incentives can be put in place in order to 
intensify linkages and technological spillovers in the same way as Mexico created 
tax incentives for imports.However, these measures are not widely used in less-
developed countries because many of them bear upon the financial budget of 
government or due to TNCs pressure on governments. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The IISP has become under the control of big corporations due to their 
economic and political power. IISP makes much easier to attract TNCs and “build 
upon that rather than to develop local capabilities to match those of affiliates” 
(LALL, 2004, p. 25). This scenario implies challenges for domestic suppliers that 
enter in unequal relations with large firms. The analysis of the automotive industry 
in Mexico shows the risk of over-dependence on FDI and the possibility for 
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domestic SMEs to remain stuck “as providers of the low-level labour services” 
(LALL, 2004, p.27). The liberalization of the market and an export-led strategy can 
freeze comparative advantages at the time of liberalization with no potential for 
upgrading (UNCTAD, 2006).GVC framework proved to be really helpful for 
identifying how the IISP affected Mexico and how the distributional mechanism 
created looser and winners. Government intervention results necessary if 
development has to be promoted and together with the importance of local effort 
should complement the GVC approach. It means combining the macro perspective 
of the internationalist literature (GEREFFI and KAPLINSKY) and the micro approach 
of the industrialist (HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ, 2002). Two final considerations 
are relevant in order to promote development and to effectively implement the 
policies recommended in the previous chapters.Firstly, there is the risk that 
targeting strategies, competition laws or industrial strategies might discourage 
TNCs from investing or force them to move elsewhere. This raises the issues that 
as the economic and political power is wielded at international level governments 
should adapt to this shift. Multilateral agreements among developing countries 
represent a valid perspective for the future by keeping as an example the 
Declaration for the “Establishment of a New International Economic Order” during 
the 1970s. Secondly, all the policies mentioned in the previous chapter require 
strong institutional and administrative competences by governments. The risk is 
that the power of TNCs and the existence of a corporatist system favour a system 
in which large companies are able to bribe “to get all manner of favours” 
including a favourable regulatory environment (STIGLITZ, 2006, p.193). Therefore, 
in order to support the promotion of CSR, competition laws and targeting 
strategies it is fundamental the role of the civil society that can contribute to create 
broader space for industrial policies rowing against the current international system. 
Drawing from Gramsci’s thinking civil society is where the current order is 
grounded and a new order can be founded because “civil society is both shaper 
and shaped, an agent of stabilization and reproduction, and a potential agent of 
transformation” (COX, 1999, p. 5).Even if hegemonic forces aim at co-opting 
these movements, the same technologies that facilitated the process of 
globalization, like internet, can contribute to the organization of civil society and a 
network able to guarantee social control, transparency and civic engagement. The 
current challenge is therefore to bridge the loosing people in the global system by 
creating a common understanding of the dynamics and consequences of 
globalization and building a common strategy and a counter hegemonic bloc. 
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